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THE INTERPRETIVE DIMENSION OF SEMINOLE ROCK  
Kevin M. Stack* 
INTRODUCTION 
A lively debate has emerged over the merits and scope of application 
of a long-standing doctrine governing the deference a court accords an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. That doctrine, traditionally 
associated with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.1 and now more fre-
quently attributed to Auer v. Robbins,2 states that a court must accept an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”3 In recent years, 
Justice Antonin Scalia has issued separate opinions calling for the doctrine 
to be reconsidered and abandoned.4 Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice 
Samuel Alito, and Justice Clarence Thomas have also announced their 
openness to reevaluating the doctrine.5  
  
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Vanderbilt University Law School. For 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, I am grateful to the participants in this Conference and 
preceding roundtable discussion, and especially to Jonathan Adler, Caroline Cecot, Sanne Kudsen, 
Neomi Rao, Kip Viscusi, and Amy Wildermuth.  
 1 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 2 519 U.S. 452 (1997). This doctrine was traditionally associated with Seminole Rock, but since 
1997 the Supreme Court and other courts have frequently attributed it to Auer. See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. 
v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265-66 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Seminole 
Rock doctrine has recently been attributed to Auer, despite the fact that Auer involved a straightforward 
application of Seminole Rock (see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (relying on Seminole Rock with little ado))). 
This Article generally refers to the doctrine as Seminole Rock or Seminole Rock/Auer, but following 
judicial practice does not make a distinction between Seminole Rock and Auer. 
 3 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
359 (1989) (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Three justices 
have indicated an interest in reconsidering this doctrine. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 
1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (joining with Justice Alito in noting that “[i]t may be 
appropriate to reconsider” Seminole Rock/Auer in another case); id. at 1339, 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (urging the Court to overturn Seminole Rock/Auer). 
 4 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging the 
Court to overturn Seminole Rock/Auer); Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2265-66 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the doctrine and announcing his interest in reconsidering it); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (urging overruling of Auer). 
 5 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that “[i]t may be appropriate 
to reconsider” Seminole Rock/Auer in another case); Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that “the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional 
questions and should be reconsidered”); cf. The Supreme Court 2011 Term: Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 Auer Deference: Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 357-58 
(2012) (noting increasing scrutiny of the doctrine).  
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As these justices have expressed an interest in reconsidering Seminole 
Rock, the Supreme Court has clarified the scope of the doctrine’s applica-
tion. First, in Gonzales v. Oregon,6 the Court made clear that if a regulation 
merely repeats statutory language, the agency’s interpretation of that re-
peated language does not qualify for deference under Seminole Rock.7 Se-
cond, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,8 the Court declined to 
accord deference to an agency interpretation in an amicus brief, and did so 
in a way that called into question whether the Court would continue treating 
agency briefs as worthy of receiving deference under Seminole Rock.9  
Further narrowing of Seminole Rock’s application seems likely given 
the disjuncture in the scope of application of Seminole Rock and Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.10 created by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp.11 In Mead, the Court con-
stricted the application of Chevron deference to statutes that grant lawmak-
ing authority to the agency and to agency actions exercising that authority.12 
Under Mead, notice-and-comment rulemaking is presumptively eligible for 
Chevron deference, whereas guidance documents and litigation briefs are 
not.13 In contrast, under Seminole Rock, an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulation in a guidance document or litigation brief still generally 
qualifies for deference.14 In an appropriate case, it would not take a grand 
leap for the Supreme Court to bring the scope of Seminole Rock’s applica-
tion in line with Chevron’s, as commentators have advocated.15 Moreover, 
the careful research by Professors Amy Wildermuth and Sanne Knudsen on 
the transformation of the Court’s decision in Seminole Rock into a free-
  
 6 546 U.S. 243 (2006).  
 7 See id. at 257 (“An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, 
instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to para-
phrase the statutory language.”).  
 8 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 9 See id. at 2170-73.  
 10 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 11 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 12 Id. at 226-27. 
 13 Id. at 229. 
 14 See, e.g., Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (according Auer deference to 
a litigation brief of the United States); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 883-84 (2011) 
(rejecting the argument that an agency amicus brief was not entitled to deference under Auer, and ac-
cording deference to the interpretation contained in the brief); but see Christopher v. SmithKline Bee-
cham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (denying Auer deference to an agency litigation brief). 
 15 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 900 (2001) 
(“Seminole Rock deference should at a minimum be subject to the same limitations that apply to the 
scope of Chevron deference.”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1484-96 (2011) (arguing that Mead’s logic for constraining Chevron’s scope 
of application extends to Seminole Rock). 
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standing, generally applicable doctrine reveals other lines for reevaluating 
the doctrine’s scope of application.16  
The reappraisal of Seminole Rock by jurists and scholars has, however, 
largely neglected the underlying question of the method a court employs to 
interpret a regulation—that is, the method of regulatory interpretation. 
When a court evaluates an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation 
under Seminole Rock, it still must adopt some method of interpreting the 
regulation to assess whether the agency’s action is “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.” Does the court make that determination of 
consistency by evaluating the regulation’s text alone or in view of other 
considerations? What interpretive tools does it invoke? Merely specifying 
that Seminole Rock applies neither resolves the question of interpretive ap-
proach nor obviates the need for it.  
In other contexts, it is widely acknowledged that a framework of re-
view requires adopting an interpretive approach. For instance, a court can-
not apply Chevron to assess the validity of agency action under a statute 
without adopting an approach to statutory interpretation. The point is an 
analogous one here: a court cannot assess the validity of agency interpreta-
tions of their own regulations without adopting (at least implicitly) a meth-
od of regulatory interpretation. Indeed, the need for an approach to interpre-
tation holds regardless of the standard of review that applies. If a court were 
to invoke a less deferential standard of review to agency constructions of 
their own regulations, such as that of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,17 as some 
commentators have advocated and the Supreme Court has on occasion ap-
plied,18 the court would even more clearly need to adopt an approach to 
regulatory interpretation. To put this basic point in more general terms, a 
framework of review of the validity of an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations has two important dimensions: the standard of review and the 
method of interpreting the regulation.19  
  
 16 See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Lessons from the Lost History of Seminole 
Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 17 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
 18 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham, 132 U.S. at 2169 (applying Skidmore to review an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference 
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 686-87 (1996) [hereinafter Man-
ning, Constitutional Structure] (arguing for adoption of the Skidmore standard).  
 19 Another dimension that is not as critical for present purposes is the timing of reasons. The 
timing of reasons concerns whether the court will uphold the agency’s position for any reasons given, 
even those offered post hoc in litigation, or whether the court will uphold the agency’s action only for 
reasons that the agency itself provided at the time it acted. This dimension is binary: uphold for any 
conceivable reason versus uphold only for reasons relied upon by the actor at the time of acting. In 
general, courts will uphold agency action only for reasons upon which the agency relied at the time it 
acted. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld 
unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its 
action can be sustained.”). 
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This Article argues that a court’s choice of interpretive method may be 
just as important, if not more important, to the outcome of review of the 
validity of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations as the standard 
of review the court applies. That is, deference to the agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulations may be as much a function of the court’s choice of 
interpretive method as the standard of review it adopts. If the framework of 
review is a problem with two dimensions—the standard of review and the 
interpretive method—then there is reason to evaluate the likely effects of 
different methods of regulatory interpretation. That investigation promises 
to shed light on the ways in which particular interpretive methods are likely 
to be more or less deferential to agency actions, as well as on the level of 
notice those methods provide the public of the regulation’s meaning.  
The distinctive legal character of notice-and-comment regulations is-
sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)—that they must be 
accompanied by an explanatory statement of their purpose, a statement of 
“basis and purpose,”20 to be procedurally and substantively valid—holds 
interesting implications for this interpretive question. In particular, building 
on my other writing on regulatory interpretation,21 this Article argues that 
interpreting regulations in light of these explanatory statements, frequently 
referred to as a regulation’s “preamble,” results in a narrower range of ac-
ceptable readings of the regulation, and offers greater notice of the regula-
tion’s meaning than looking to the regulatory text alone. As a result, this 
method of regulatory interpretation, which this Article calls regulatory 
purposivism, holds promise for addressing many of the concerns raised by 
Seminole Rock, whether or not the Supreme Court decides to overrule the 
doctrine. 
I. SEMINOLE ROCK AND ITS CHALLENGES 
Administrative agencies frequently offer interpretations of their own 
regulations, whether in adjudicative decisions, guidance documents, the 
preambles to the regulations, opinion letters, or briefs. Firm numbers on the 
volume of guidance documents and agency adjudications are hard to find, 
  
 20 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).  
 21 Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 357 (2012) (highlighting the 
lack of attention to regulatory interpretation and proposing a textually constrained purposive theory of 
regulatory interpretation). In this symposium contribution, the focus is on how the method of regulatory 
interpretation defended in Interpreting Regulations, supra, applies in the context of Seminole Rock; the 
timing of this contribution did not permit engagement with Professor Jennifer Nou’s forthcoming article 
Regulatory Textualism, 64 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2015), which thoughtfully joins the debate over the 
proper methodology of for interpreting regulations. Professor Nou takes issue with aspects of the inter-
pretive approach defended in Interpreting Regulations, and argues for a form of regulatory textualism 
that emphasizes those sources most likely to contain sincere, not strategic, statements of the terms of 
agreement with the agency’s political principals. 
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but most estimates take the volume of guidance to substantially exceed that 
of regulations,22 and the dockets of administrative tribunals to tower over 
those of the federal courts.23 Not every guidance document or agency adju-
dication interprets the agency’s own regulations. Some interpret the statuto-
ry framework directly, for instance. But when disputes about regulatory 
interpretation make their way to court, the courts are typically faced with an 
agency’s own interpretation of the regulation, either because the agency is a 
party to the dispute or has issued a freestanding interpretation. As a result, 
for courts, the business of regulatory interpretation often involves address-
ing an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. 
For some time,24 the doctrine associated with Seminole Rock and Auer 
has defined review of agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. 
Seminole Rock/Auer states a standard of review—that an agency’s interpre-
tation of its own regulation is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or in-
consistent with the regulation.’”25 As explained in other writing,26 the Semi-
nole Rock/Auer line of authority provides some guidance on how a court is to 
judge whether an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is permissible, but 
judicial practice has not been consistent. In Seminole Rock, the Court advised 
that its “tools . . . are the plain words of the regulation and any relevant inter-
pretations of the Administrator.”27 A strain of precedent relies primarily on 
the plain meaning of the regulation. In Auer, for instance, the Court upheld 
the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the department’s own regulations 
based primarily on dictionary definitions of the critical regulatory phrase 
(“subject to”).28 Likewise, in Christensen v. Harris County,29 on the basis of 
  
 22 See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2007) (noting the volume of guidance exceeds that of notice-and-comment 
rules); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468-69 (1992) (noting that 
the volume of guidance of the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission all vastly outnumber their respective formal regulations).  
 23 Compare SSA Administrative Data: Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., at tbl. 2.F9 
(2013), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2013/2f8-2f11.pdf (showing that the 
Social Security Administration received 849,869 hearing requests in 2012 alone), with Judicial Caseload 
Indicators, U.S. COURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/judicial-
caseload-indicators.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (showing that in federal courts in 2013, 56,475 
appeals were filed, 284,604 civil cases were filed, and 91,266 criminal cases were filed). 
 24 See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 16 (exploring the doctrine’s development). 
 25 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945))). 
 26 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 372-73. 
 27 Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). 
 28 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (citing definitions from two dictionaries to support the conclusion that the 
phrase “comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns”); see also, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. W. 
Fuels-Utah, Inc., 900 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (looking to ordinary usage and the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary definition to determine the meaning of “supervisory”). 
 29 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
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the text alone, the Court rejected an agency’s construction of a regulation.30 
The Court, however, has not justified this particular emphasis on plain mean-
ing, and courts continue to invoke other interpretive tools in determining 
whether an agency’s construction is permissible.31 The Supreme Court has 
relied on “the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulga-
tion,”32 canons of statutory construction,33 statutory language and purpose,34 
the consistency of the agency’s interpretation over time,35 the regulation’s 
own procedural history,36 and the consistency with the agency’s statement of 
basis and purpose.37 In these and other decisions under Seminole Rock, the 
Court pays little attention to the interpretive methods it invokes; it does not 
  
 30 Id. at 587-88 (“The regulation in this case, however, is not ambiguous—it is plainly permissive. 
To defer to the agency’s position would be to permit the agency . . . to create de facto a new regula-
tion.”); see also Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878-80 (2011) (finding the regula-
tion ambiguous based on text alone); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 514 (1994) 
(“The regulation provides, in unambiguous terms, that the ‘costs’ of these educational activities will not 
be reimbursed when they are the result of a ‘redistribution,’ or shift, of costs from an ‘educational’ 
facility to a ‘patient care’ facility . . . .”). 
 31 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 372-74 (citing examples of this methodo-
logical diversity).  
 32 Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 
512. 
 33 E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007) (invoking a presump-
tion that “the specific governs the general” and citing statutory authorities in which specific statutory 
preemption provisions trumped general savings provisions, and specific statutory sentencing provisions 
trumped general ones). 
 34 See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170-73 (2012) (rejecting 
an agency’s interpretation on grounds that it defied statutory language and purposes of statutory provi-
sions); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 401-02 (2008) (rejecting an interpretation of a 
regulation because it would be in tension with structure and purposes of authorizing statute); Coke, 551 
U.S. at 169-70 (invoking congressional intent as a basis for resolving conflict between literal readings of 
two regulations); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (refusing to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation because it would force the Court “to conclude 
that [the Secretary] has not fulfilled her statutory duty”). 
 35 Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 699 (1991) (deferring to the Secretary’s inter-
pretation, as the same “position has been faithfully advanced by each Secretary since the regulations 
were promulgated”); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 
(1987) (granting deference and noting that the agency’s interpretation “has been, with one exception, 
consistently maintained through Board decisions”); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (deferring to 
the agency and noting that “[s]ince their promulgation, the Secretary has consistently construed both 
orders not to bar oil and gas leases”). 
 36 See, e.g., Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 428 n.14 (drawing an inference that term “recipient” includes 
first-time “applicants” for benefits despite the change in language from “applicant or recipient” in pro-
posed regulation to “applicant” in final regulation on the ground that “recipient” was “inadvertently 
omitted” (emphasis omitted)). 
 37 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2171; Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. 
Ct. 2254, 2263 (2011); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 287-91 
(2009) (invoking an agency’s statement of basis and purpose to reject claimed inconsistency between 
agency’s actions with its regulations). 
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pause to justify its reliance on one method or another, or to distinguish the 
case at hand from prior decisions that invoked different interpretive tools. 
Indeed, in the Court’s Seminole Rock line of decisions, it is difficult to 
discern any attention, much less careful consideration, of the method of 
regulatory interpretation.  
Seminole Rock has gradually acquired a cluster of academic and judi-
cial critics. These criticisms have largely focused on grounds other than the 
Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach to regulatory interpretation under the 
doctrine. An appropriate place to start is with Professor Robert Anthony, 
who was one of the first to press the point that Seminole Rock rested un-
comfortably alongside the APA’s provision on the scope of judicial review, 
enacted two years after Seminole Rock was decided.38 Section 706 of the 
APA provides that the reviewing court “shall decide all relevant questions 
of law . . . and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an 
agency action.”39 Professor Anthony urged that this provision of the APA 
“manifestly was to arm affected persons with recourse to an independent 
judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agen-
cy is often an adverse party.”40 The structure of this Section lends some 
support for this interpretation.41 Section 706 expressly provides for deferen-
tial review in other respects—as to review of facts and the exercise of dis-
cretion42—but not as to legal interpretation.43 In addition, Section 706 places 
the interpretation of agency action on the same footing as constitutional 
interpretation,44 and courts do not generally defer to agencies’ interpretation 
of the Constitution. The legislative history of the APA also offers some 
support.45  
The Supreme Court, however, has not shown particular interest in the 
text of the APA when elaborating the standard of review applicable to 
agency action (as opposed to review of agency action for compliance with 
the APA’s procedural requirements, where the Court has shown more inter-
est in the APA’s text).46 The Chevron doctrine rests with a small toehold of 
  
 38 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 10(e) (1946). 
 39 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 40 See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 
10 ADMIN. L. J. 1, 9 (1996); see also Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 376-77 (noting 
this neglect of the APA).  
 41 John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 113, 193-94 
(1998).  
 42 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 43 Duffy, supra note 41, at 194. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 193-94.  
 46 See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 
United States, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 317, 318-22 
(Christopher Forsyth et al. eds. 2010) (arguing that hard look and Chevron doctrines have a tenuous 
connection to the APA’s text); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How 
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the text of the APA, and the Court’s elaboration of the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard proceeds largely in a common law vein with little concern 
for tying the doctrine to the statute.47 Perhaps for this reason, Professor An-
thony’s challenge to Seminole Rock on the basis of the APA has not made 
much headway before the Court. 
The criticism of the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine that has gained the 
most support on the Supreme Court is the argument that the doctrine pro-
vides no disincentive for agencies to promulgate vague regulations in part 
because the doctrine allows agencies to obtain deference to their own inter-
pretation of those vague regulations. The four-justice dissenting opinion 
authored by Justice Clarence Thomas in Thomas Jefferson University Hos-
pital v. Shalala48 is a fount for this critique. There, Justice Thomas argued 
that accepting an agency’s construction of a “hopelessly vague regulation” 
undermined the purpose of delegation, which is to “resol[ve] . . . ambiguity 
in a statutory text”49 by issuing rules that are “clear and definite so that af-
fected parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency’s under-
standing of the law.”50 Professors Anthony and John Manning elaborated 
this line of argument.51 As Professor Manning encapsulates this criticism, 
Seminole Rock presents an increased risk of agencies issuing vague regula-
tions because when the agency chooses to adopt vague terms, “it does so 
knowing that a court will have no basis for disturbing the agency’s interpre-
tation of empty regulatory terms.”52 Justice Scalia has embraced this line of 
reasoning.53  
  
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 788-91 (2010) 
(arguing Chevron is inconsistent with the APA); Duffy, supra note 41, at 118 (noting tension between 
APA’s text and Chevron); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common 
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 509 (2010) (arguing that elaboration of hard look and Chevron standards 
of review are common law, as opposed to statutory, in character); see generally Jack M. Beermann & 
Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 892-900 (2007) (identify-
ing several doctrines that substantially exceed APA § 553’s text). The Supreme Court enforced the text 
of the APA more closely when lower courts have imposed procedural requirements beyond the mini-
mum required by the APA.  See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206-07 (2015) 
(“Time and again, we have reiterated that the APA ‘sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to 
review executive agency action for procedural correctness.’” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009))).  
 47 See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1293, 1299-1300 (2012). 
 48 512 U.S. 518, 526 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. at 525 (alteration in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 
(1991)) (second internal quotation marks omitted).  
 50 Id. at 525.  
 51 Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 18, at 659-60. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Auer deference encourages agencies to be ‘vague in framing regulations, with 
the plan of issuing “interpretations” to create the intended new law without observance of notice and 
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This pragmatic concern about the incentives and rewards the doctrine 
creates for agencies is frequently accompanied by a broader separation of 
powers concern. For Justice Scalia and others writing in this context, Mon-
tesquieu is often invoked for the principle that “[w]hen the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of 
magistrates, there can be no liberty.”54 The Constitution’s design reflects 
that inspiration in many respects. The particular thrust of the concern with 
regard to Seminole Rock/Auer is that the doctrine augments the potential for 
abuse incident to the consolidation of power in a single institution: the 
agency.  
The spirit of these general critiques of Seminole Rock, as well as the 
thrust of the more specific arguments that its scope needs to be limited to 
match that of Chevron,55 finds most prominent expression in the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in SmithKline Beecham. In SmithKline Beecham, the 
Court declined to apply Seminole Rock/Auer deference to the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of its own regulations in a litigation brief, despite 
having recently deferred to agency views expressed in amicus briefs.56 The 
specific question before the Court was whether pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentatives qualified as “outside salesm[e]n,” under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”) as it is administered by the Department of Labor.57 The De-
partment of Labor had defined the statutory term “outside salesman” in its 
regulations as “any employee . . . [w]hose primary duty is . . . making sales 
within the meaning of” the FLSA.58 Its regulations also stated that “[s]ales 
within the meaning of [the statute] include the transfer of title to tangible 
  
comment procedures’” (quoting Anthony, supra note 40, at 11-12)); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. 
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of 
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, 
to do what it pleases. This frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes 
arbitrary government.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing a passage from MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 151-52 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent 
trans., 1949)); Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting same passage); Man-
ning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 18, at 645 (quoting same passage). 
 55 See scholars cited in supra note 15.  
 56 In 2011, the Court twice concluded that agency amicus briefs qualify for Seminole Rock defer-
ence, rejecting the argument that under Mead and Christensen they should not. See Pliva, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (relying on the brief of the United States); Chase Bank USA, 
N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 883-84 (2011) (rejecting the argument that an agency amicus brief was 
not entitled to deference under Auer, and according deference to the interpretation contained in the 
brief). 
 57 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58 Id. at 2162 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (2004)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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property.”59 In the preamble to the regulations, the department stressed that 
the “outside salesman” exception applies whenever an employee “in some 
sense make[s] a sale,”60 and should not depend on technicalities such as 
whether the employee “types the order into a computer system and hits the 
return button.”61  
For many years, the Department of Labor had considered pharmaceu-
tical sales representatives to be “outside salesmen” under the regulations, a 
view that is both permissible under the text of the regulation and supported 
by the department’s statement in the regulation’s preamble that even those 
who “‘in some sense’ make a sale” should be considered outside sales-
men.62 In the litigation at issue, the Department of Labor changed course; in 
a sequence of amicus briefs in pending cases, it took the position that phar-
maceutical sales representatives were not outside salesmen.63 The Court 
rejected the argument that it must defer to the department’s new position on 
fair notice grounds: “To defer to the agency’s interpretation in this circum-
stance would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should pro-
vide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits 
or requires.’”64 The Court went on to note that to defer in this case would 
“result in precisely the kind of ‘unfair surprise’ against which our cases 
have long warned.”65 The Court invoked a bedrock principle of notice, for 
which NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.66 provides a classic articulation: an 
agency should not be permitted to change the interpretation in an adjudica-
tive proceeding where doing so imposes “new liability . . . on individuals 
for past actions which were taken in good-faith reliance on [agency] pro-
nouncements.”67 The Court concluded that deferring to the Department of 
Labor’s position in its amicus brief would raise precisely these fair notice 
problems.68 The text of the regulations, the Court reasoned, does not give 
“clear notice” that the kind of selling in which pharmaceutical representa-
tives engage falls outside of the definition of sales.69 Moreover, the Court 
noted that the agency’s prior guidance in its preamble, which explained that 
  
 59 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.503) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  
 60 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, 
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,162 
(Apr. 23, 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61 Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,163) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62 Id at 2165. 
 63 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2165. 
 64 Id. at 2167 (alteration in original) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).  
 65 Id. (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170-71 (2007)).  
 66 416 U.S. 267 (1974).  
 67 Id. at 295; see also SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (quoting same). 
 68 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2167.  
 69 Id. 
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the employee must “in some sense” make a sale, supported this conclu-
sion.70  
In light of SmithKline Beecham, its seems very plausible that the Court 
would, in an appropriate case, eliminate the disjuncture between the scope 
of Chevron and Seminole Rock’s application by limiting Seminole Rock to 
agency actions that would qualify for Chevron deference under Mead. That 
would eliminate deference to agency briefs under Seminole Rock, but pre-
sumably preserve it for agency decisions rendered in formal adjudications. 
Or, perhaps, Justice Scalia will be able to persuade his fellow justices to 
eliminate the doctrine root-and-branch.  
II. A PROBLEM WITH TWO DIMENSIONS 
What has been largely overlooked in this debate over Seminole Rock is 
the importance of the reviewing court’s approach to interpreting the regula-
tion at issue—a question that will be all the more front-and-center if the 
Court does abandon the doctrine. The extent of deference to agencies’ in-
terpretations of their own regulations, and the incentives that it creates for 
agencies, does not only depend on the standard of review the court applies. 
Rather, the overall framework for judicial review includes the interpretive 
approach the court adopts when it interprets the regulations. The interpre-
tive approach is how the court determines what constitutes the best or the 
range of permissible reading of the regulation—say, by reading the regula-
tory text alone, the text in light of canons of construction, the agency’s jus-
tifications for it, and so on.  
The point that the interpretive approach matters to how a standard of 
review applies is a familiar one in the context of debates over Chevron. 
Perhaps the most well-known and robustly stated position on this relation-
ship is the following comment from Justice Scalia:  
In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which a person is 
(for want of a better word) a “strict constructionist”' of statutes, and the degree to which that 
person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope. The reason is obvious. One who 
finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its 
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for 
Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an 
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one 
who abhors a “plain meaning” rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute 
  
 70 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Ad-
ministrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,162 (Apr. 
23, 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2168 (“It is one thing to expect regulated 
parties to conform their conduct to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is 
quite another to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held 
liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and 
demands deference.”). 
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to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambi-
guity, and will discern a much broader range of “reasonable” interpretation that the agency 
may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron 
will require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely greater.71 
If Justices Scalia’s premises are correct, a textualist applying a deferential 
standard of review may end up deferring to the agency less often than an 
intentionalist applying de novo review, and thus the choice of interpretive 
method trumps (or at least substantially mitigates) the choice of standard. 
Whether or not one agrees with Justice Scalia’s position that textualists in 
statutory interpretation will need to defer less often under Chevron than 
those who look to legislative history,72 the more general point is that the 
interpretive approach the court adopts influences the operation of the stand-
ard of review.  
That general point has intuitive appeal, but does it have any empirical 
support? Empirical studies have not tested the relative influence of interpre-
tive methodology under Seminole Rock. Empirical work on Chevron and 
Skidmore, however, is suggestive of the influence of interpretive choice 
within the framework of review. In Professor William Eskridge and Lauren 
Baer’s comprehensive study of deference regimes on the Supreme Court 
between 1983 and 2005, they found strikingly close agency win rates under 
Chevron and Skidmore, with the agency winning in 76.2 percent of cases 
under Chevron, and 73.5 percent under Skidmore.73 This finding throws 
cold water on the extensive judicial, litigation, and scholarly resources ex-
pended on determining whether Chevron or Skidmore applies. This mere 
three percent difference between Chevron’s “deferential” standard and “the 
power to persuade” of Skidmore suggests that the difference between these 
standards of review is not doing a great deal of work, at least in the Su-
preme Court, in determining how frequently agencies win and lose when 
those standards are invoked.74   
  
 71 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 521. 
 72 In an article close in time to Justice Scalia’s postulation, Professor Merrill suggest that this 
point is “at best unproven.” See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 370 (1994) (suggesting, based on a study of four Supreme Court terms, that it is 
difficult to support the claim that the dominant effect of legislative history is to expand range of possible 
meanings); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) 
(discussing the influence of textualism on Chevron). 
 73 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1142.  
 74 Some studies show a lower win rate for agencies under Skidmore in the federal courts of ap-
peals. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Stand-
ard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007) (showing a 60 percent agency win rate under Skidmore in 
the federal courts of appeals); Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What 
Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1896-1905 (2006) (showing lower agency 
affirmance rate of 39 percent under Skidmore). 
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Eskridge and Baer’s other findings, as well as those of a study by Pro-
fessors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein,75 suggest the possible influences 
of Justice’s different methods of statutory interpretation. Eskridge and Baer 
find a greater difference in the agency win rates among the Supreme Court 
justices than reflected in this overall difference in whether Chevron or 
Skidmore applies.76 They report, for instance, that the overall agreement rate 
with the agency for Justice Stephen Breyer is 72 percent, while Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg is 69.5 percent, Justice Scalia is 64.5 percent, Justice 
Thomas is 63.1 percent, and Justice John Paul Stevens is 60.9 percent.77  
Specifically testing the agency affirmance rates when Chevron is in-
voked, Miles and Sunstein found that Justice Breyer’s affirmance rate is 
81.8 percent, while Justice Ginsburg is 74.0 percent, Justice Scalia is 52.2 
percent and Justice Thomas is 53.6 percent.78 Given the different views 
these justices have about how to interpret statutes—roughly, with Justices 
Scalia and Thomas favoring textualism, and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
taking legislative history and broader legal context as more relevant—their 
different views of statutory interpretation may play an important role in 
explaining their different voting patterns. Miles and Sunstein specifically 
tested whether adherence to “plain meaning” methodology explains the 
justices’ voting patters in Chevron cases.79 Though Miles and Sunstein’s 
empirical tests could not distinguish the influence of interpretive methods 
from the justices’ attitudes toward the bureaucracy and pure political pref-
erence,80 they find support for Justice’s Scalia’s prediction that adherents to 
textualism will defer less often to the agency’s position under Chevron.81 
And indeed, they show that in Chevron cases, Justice Scalia himself is the 
least likely justice to defer to the agency.82  
There are reasons to be cautious about the implications of these find-
ings when considering how much interpretive dimension matters with re-
gard to judging the validity of the agency’s interpretations of its own regu-
lations. First, Eskridge and Baer’s study reports a higher agency win rate—
90.9 percent—under Seminole Rock.83 That higher win rate might suggest a 
greater difference between the Seminole Rock and Skidmore standards than 
  
 75 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Inves-
tigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 828-829 (2006) (identifying the influence of approach to 
statutory interpretation under Chevron as a “formalist hypothesis” for explaining Chevron outcomes). 
 76 Compare Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1099 (showing agency win rate in Supreme Court 
is 73.5 percent under Skidmore and 76.2 percent under Chevron), with id. at 1054 (showing range 81.3 
percent to 52.6 percent agency win rate by Supreme Court justice).  
 77 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1154. 
 78 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 832 (tbl. 1, col. 1). 
 79 See id. at 831.  
 80 Id. at 838.  
 81 Id.  
 82 See id. at 826, 832 (tbl. 1, col. 1).  
 83 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1142. 
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Chevron and Skidmore, even though the legal formulation of Seminole Rock 
and Chevron’s formulation is quite similar.84 Second, it could be that meth-
ods for interpreting regulations are less important than methods of statutory 
interpretation, though it is not clear in principle why that would be the case. 
Third, even in the detailed studies such as Miles and Sunstein’s, it is hard to 
pull apart the explanatory role of interpretive commitments from other con-
founding political and ideological influences.  
Even with these qualifications, this empirical work is, at the very least, 
suggestive that the choice of interpretive method matters to how a standard 
of review operates. Given that a court cannot avoid adopting an interpretive 
approach when it assesses the validity of an agency’s action under the 
agency’s own regulation—whether it does so under Seminole Rock or 
Skidmore—there is reason to expand the debate about Seminole Rock to 
include an interpretive dimension. 
 
III. INTERPRETIVE APPROACH: REGULATORY PURPOSIVISM 
So what method of interpretation should courts adopt when interpret-
ing regulations under Seminole Rock (or under another standard)? Does 
Justice Scalia’s prediction that textualists defer less often to agency inter-
pretations with which they disagree hold when a court is evaluating an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations? More generally, which 
methods of regulatory interpretation will end up being more or less deferen-
tial to agencies?  
The debate over methods of regulatory interpretation is generations 
behind that of statutory interpretation and has hardly considered the inter-
pretive dimension of Seminole Rock. As a way to start this examination, it 
makes sense to compare two different approaches to regulatory interpreta-
tion—textualism and purposivism. This analysis suggests that regulatory 
  
 84 Just as Chevron requires a court to independently assess whether the agency’s interpretation is 
precluded by the statute, Seminole Rock requires a court to independently assess whether the agency’s 
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with its regulations. Both doctrines thus involve an 
element of independent judicial review to determine if the agency’s action is permissible, and then 
deference to the agency’s interpretations inside of those parameters. As a result, contrary to a recent 
suggestion of Justice Thomas, Seminole Rock does not (wholly) “preclude[] judges from independently 
determining” the meaning of the regulation. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). That independent judicial judgment is required under Seminole Rock to 
determine whether the agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the regulation before Seminole Rock 
triggers deference to the agency. Indeed, Justice Thomas allows as much in noting that Seminole Rock 
deference is not absolute, but applies only to interpretations that are plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation. See id. (noting this exception). The substantive disagreement, then, is not over 
whether Seminole Rock requires any independent judicial judgment (it does) but over how narrow that 
independent check is. 
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purposivism, as defined below, is less deferential to post hoc agency inter-
pretations of their own regulations than relying on the text alone whether 
review is under the Seminole Rock standard or a more rigorous one such as 
Skidmore. This approach to regulatory interpretation also has the prospect 
of providing greater notice of a regulation’s meaning than relying on the 
regulation’s text alone.  
A. Methods Defined 
Over the last decade, the debate over statutory interpretation has grad-
ually resolved into a debate between textualism and purposivism.85 These 
two contrasting methodological approaches provide a good point of com-
parison for evaluating regulatory interpretation.86  
Textualism understands the interpreter’s goal is to ascertain a reasona-
ble public meaning of the text.87 With regard to statutes, textualists argue 
that legislation frequently lacks an agreed-upon purpose, and therefore it 
does not make sense for a judge to interpret legislation in light of purposes 
other than those discernible from or expressed in the enacted text—that is, 
those “a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed 
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”88 Textualists further contend 
that a method of statutory interpretation that makes discerning the purpose 
of a statute a central feature does not provide an attractive account of the 
judicial role.89 Moreover, at a practical level, textualists object that even if 
legislative purpose were a coherent idea in statutory interpretation, it is ex-
tremely difficult to discern. As a result, trying to do so leads to more judi-
cial errors than focusing on the enacted text.90  
Some textualists eschew relying on legislative intent on the ground 
that the intent of the lawmakers is not is publically available as a source of 
notice. In this vein, Justice Scalia writes, “it is simply incompatible with 
  
 85 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 75 (2006) (describing the remaining differences between textualism and purposivism); Jonathan T. 
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006) (characterizing the same). 
 86 As noted above, Professor Nou’s forthcoming article, Regulatory Textualism, joins this debate, 
see supra note 21; though timing did not permit discussion of her arguments in this Article, the interest-
ed reader will find in Professor Nou’s article points of overlap and disagreement on the proper technique 
of regulatory interpretation as well as on the account of regulatory textualism relevant to the discussion 
below. 
 87 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
17 (Amy Gutmann ed.,1997); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 
2410-13 (2003). 
 88 SCALIA, supra note 87, at 17. 
 89 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983).  
 90 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 112 (2006) (arguing that consulting legislative history increased incidents of 
judicial error in ways not shared by statutory text).  
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democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the 
meaning of the law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by 
what the lawgiver promulgated.”91 On this point, Justice Scalia invokes the 
Roman emperor Nero, who posted edicts high up on pillars so they could 
not easily be read.92 With regard to regulations, a textualist approach would 
seek to interpret the regulation based on the text of the regulation itself, as 
the binding document that constitutes the law, understood against the se-
mantic context of other regulations and related statutes. This view may un-
dergird the Supreme Court’s occasional reference to the plain meaning of 
the regulations as the interpretive question under Seminole Rock.93  
The formulation of purposivism for regulations at issue here has two 
important elements. The first is a commitment to interpreting the regulation 
in accordance with its text. In this sense, it operates very much the same 
way as textualism; it seeks to understand the best reading of the text in its 
semantic context, and thus has much in common with what has been called 
the new purposivism94 or with regard to statutes, a reading that has a strong 
foundation in Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s legal process mate-
rials.95 Second, the reader should check the prospective construction of the 
regulatory text to see that it accords with the agency’s own public justifica-
tion and explanation of the regulation provided in the “statement of basis 
and purpose,”96 which forms the bulk of the preamble. Because a regulation 
issued through notice-and-comment is not procedurally or substantively 
valid without such a statement,97 interpreting a regulation in light of the 
statement of basis and purpose is not seeking to interpret the regulation 
through an unexpressed intent. Accordingly, it does not raise the specter of 
emperor Nero that Justice Scalia invokes. Paying close attention to the pre-
amble is a focus on a public source of justification of the regulation. This 
approach requires that the interpretation of the regulation be at least con-
sistent with the purposes and other positions the agency has set forth in its 
exposition for the rule appearing in its statement of basis and purpose. For 
this regulatory purposivist approach, then, there are two privileged interpre-
  
 91 SCALIA, supra note 87, at 17. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
 94 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 117 (characterizing a 
new strain in the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases where the purpose only plays a role if 
the text is broad enough to permit it).  
 95 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 385-91 (highlighting the role of enacted 
purpose and text for Hart and Sacks and foundations of this view in their principle of “institutional 
settlement”); see also Manning, supra note 94, at 117-18 (highlighting institutional settlement’s role for 
Hart and Sacks and recent judicial decisions reflecting that role). 
 96 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
 97 See New Eng. Coal. on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (to 
compy with APA § 553(c) “an agency rule must be accompanied by a statement of basis and purpose” 
to be procedurally valid).  
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tive sources: the text of the regulation and the justification and explanation 
of the regulation provided in the statement of basis and purpose,98 with the 
regulatory text governing in case of conflict.  
B. Deference and Range of Acceptable Meanings 
As an interpretive approach, regulatory purposivism results in a nar-
rower range of acceptable or permissible readings of regulations than 
textualism. This is most easily seen by comparing the two approaches under 
the deferential Seminole Rock/Auer standard. For a court applying this def-
erential standard of review, the doctrinal question is whether the agency’s 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” that 
is, whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible one. Now consider 
how a textualist and a regulatory purposivist address that question. For a 
textualist, the sole question is whether the agency’s interpretation is a per-
missible reading of the text of the regulation. A regulatory purposivist asks 
the same question the textualist does about what is permissible under the 
text, but also adds a separate inquiry as to whether any given construction is 
consistent with (or carries forward) the justification and explanations for the 
regulation in the preamble.  
In principle, then, the range of permissible interpretations for a 
purposivist is narrower than for a textualist. One can think of this as two 
intersecting circles of a Venn diagram, as depicted in Figure 1 below, with 
one circle representing the textually permissible interpretations, and the 
other representing interpretations consistent with the regulation’s preamble. 
The textualist will defer to any interpretation that is textually permissible, 
as represented by those within the left circle. A nontextually constrained 
purposivist would defer to interpretations in the right circle. In contrast to 
both of these approaches, a regulatory purposivist will defer only to inter-
pretations in the shaded portion where the two circles overlap. Because the 
regulatory purposivist approach has an additional requirement for an inter-
pretation to be a permissible one—textual permissibility plus consistency 
with purposes and other statements in the preamble—a court deploying this 
approach will find a narrower set of interpretations consistent with the regu-
lations under Seminole Rock than a court applying a texualist approach. As 
a result, when a court employs a regulatory purposivist approach under 
Seminole Rock, the agency has less flexibility in interpreting its own regula-






 98 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 398. 
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Figure 1 
  
This result is not limited to a court applying Seminole Rock. Even if 
the court were applying a Skidmore or de novo standard of review, the regu-
latory purposivist method would identify a narrower set of readings ac-
ceptable than a textualist method would. If the text of the regulation is 
clear, there should be no difference between the two approaches; both will 
follow the clear meaning of the regulation’s text. But with regard to ambig-
uous regulations, the regulatory purposivist approach should result in the 
court deferring to an agency’s ex post interpretation of the regulation less 
often than a textualist approach. The reason runs parallel to the one above: 
if the regulation’s text is ambiguous, a court looking for a reading that 
makes the most sense of the regulation’s text and the commitments the 
agency made in its preamble should end up finding a narrower range of 
agency interpretations convincing. The additional requirement of interpret-
ing the ambiguous regulatory text in light of the preamble constrains, at 
least in principle, the scope of interpretations allowed by ambiguous regula-
tory text. Accordingly, a regulatory purposivist should be less deferential 
under Skidmore to an agency’s later issued interpretations than a textualist 
because a narrower range of interpretations will be acceptable to the regula-
tory purposivist.  
Whether applied under Seminole Rock or Skidmore, this textually con-
strained purposivist approach effectively uses the agency’s prior commit-
ments in the preamble to limit the scope of its later interpretation. As a re-
sult, this method grants less deference than textualism to the agency’s later 
issued interpretations, but does so by granting a greater interpretive role 
than textualism would to the agency’s contemporaneous justification of its 
regulations appearing in regulatory preambles.  
Interpretations 
Permitted by the 
Regulation’s Text 
Interpretations Consistent 
with the Regulation’s the 
Preamble 
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C. Predictability 
An interpretive approach that identifies a narrower range of acceptable 
meanings may augment notice of the meaning; a relatively small set of ac-
ceptable meanings reduces uncertainty for the regulated. Still, an approach 
that identifies a narrower range of acceptable meanings does no good if no 
one can figure out what they are. To provide greater notice, an interpretive 
approach must have a claim to producing results that are more predictable 
to the relevant audience, not just specifying a narrower range of permissible 
meanings.  
Because regulatory purposivism relies on the examination of extra-
textual sources—the statement of basis and purpose included in the regula-
tion’s preamble—as part of the interpretive method, it has a special burden 
to overcome with regard to predictability. A common criticism of statutory 
interpretation methods that rely on consulting legislative history, for in-
stance, is that they lead to more frequent judicial errors, and thus less pre-
dictability. From this perspective, consulting extra-textual sources con-
founds predictability as opposed to augmenting it.  
Several distinctive legal features of regulations suggest that the enter-
prise of gaining guidance from a regulatory preamble promises more pre-
dictability than working with legislative history. Unlike statutes, the validi-
ty of regulations depends upon their being issued with a “statement of their 
basis and purpose,”99 which explains the grounds and purposes of the regu-
lations in light of statutory objectives.100 Regulations are not procedurally 
valid unless they include this accompanying statement.101 Further, under 
well-established doctrines of administrative law, the substantive validity of 
regulations is also judged on the basis of these statements.102 This way in 
which the text of a regulation and the statement of basis and purpose are 
bound up together—a rule’s validity depends upon its statement—
  
 99 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring the agency to issue a “statement of their basis and purpose”). 
See also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 259 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 225 (2d Sess. 1946). The Senate Document contains as 
an appendix the Attorney General’s 1945 report on Senate Bill 7. The Attorney General’s report stated 
the following in regards to the statement of basis and purpose:  
Section 4 (b), in requiring the publication of a concise general statement of the basis and 
purpose of rules made without formal hearing, is not intended to require an elaborate analysis 
of rules or of the detailed considerations upon which they are based but is designed to enable 
the public to obtain a general idea of the purpose of, and a statement of the basic justification 
for, the rules. The requirement would also serve much the same function as the whereas 
clauses which are now customarily found in the preambles of Executive orders. 
Id. 
 100 Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 101 Id. 
 102 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 379 (explaining rule of these statements 
in substantive review of agency regulations). 
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strengthens the grounds for reading the rule in light of the explanatory 
statement.  
In addition, at a practical level, the statement of basis and purpose fa-
cilitates its use by courts and the public in a way that is not true of legisla-
tive history. First, legislative history includes multiple types of sources 
(e.g., committee reports, floor statements, etc.), from multiple different 
voices, over extended periods of time. Each part of the legislative history 
represents the views of only a subpart of the legislature. In contrast, pream-
bles are issued on behalf of the agency itself, not a subgroup within it; they 
constitute authoritative guidance about the agency’s understanding of the 
meaning of the regulations at the time they are issued. This message comes 
through clearly in the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act.103 Of the statement of basis and purpose, the Manual opines, 
“[t]he required statement will be important in that the courts and the public 
may be expected to use such statements in the interpretation of the agency’s 
rules.”104 Moreover, because the validity of the rule depends upon the quali-
ty of the agency’s reasoning in these statements, in general, they are care-
fully crafted, highly organized documents, issued in a single voice.105 In 
short, discerning guidance from preambles about the meaning of the regula-
tions is more practical than using the multiple sources of legislative history 
in statutory interpretation.  
Suppose, then, that consulting regulatory preambles is not subject to 
the same practical objections levied against legislative history. That leaves 
us with the difficult question of whether it is easier to predict how the 
meaning of an ambiguous regulation will be fixed by, on the one hand, con-
sulting the regulation’s preamble as a privileged source for limiting its 
scope, or, on the other hand, redoubling efforts at affixing meaning from 
the regulatory text alone. As opposed to addressing this point abstractly, 
let’s turn to an example to suggest the promise of preambles to narrow am-
biguous regulatory language in a predictable way.  
D. No Drones in the Park? 
The most famous hypothetical for teasing apart the difference between 
textualism and more purpose-based forms of interpretation is Professors 
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller’s debate over the application of a “no vehicles 
  
 103 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 32 (1947). 
 104 Id. 
 105 The Administrative Conference of the United States recently issued a recommendation that 
recognized the guidance function of preambles and proposed a set of best practices for agencies in the 
drafting of preambles to facilitate that function. See Adoption of Recommendations, 79 Fed. Reg. 
35,988, 35,992 (June 25, 2014). The author of this Article was the consultant to the Conference on this 
project.  
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in the park” prohibition.106 Current technology has turned up a new iteration 
of this hypothetical for the age of regulatory interpretation: are unmanned 
aircraft allowed in the national parks?  
This summer the National Park Service (“NPS”) issued a Policy 
Memorandum to the superintendents of the National Parks to prohibit the 
flying of drones in their parks.107 The memorandum advised the superinten-
dents to invoke their authority under a provision of the NPS regulations that 
authorizes the superintendents to impose limitations on the use of the parks 
based on a finding that such a limit is necessary for “maintenance of public 
health and safety, protection of environmental or scenic values”108 among 
other values, so long as those limits are “[c]onsistent with applicable legis-
lation and Federal administrative policies.”109 This memorandum stated that 
the park superintendents should invoke this emergency authority “[b]ecause 
the existing NPS regulations can only be used to address unmanned aircraft 
in certain circumstances.”110 One might ask, then, whether prohibiting 
drones on this basis is consistent with other NPS regulations?  
The NPS regulations concerning aircraft and air delivery prohibit 
“[o]perating or using aircraft on lands or waters other than at locations des-
ignated pursuant to special regulations” as well as “[d]elivering or retriev-
ing a person or object by parachute, helicopter, or other airborne means, 
except in emergencies involving public safety or serious property loss, or 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of a permit.”111 The regulations define 
“aircraft” as “a device that is used or intended to be used for human flight 
in the air, including powerless flight.”112 Because the drones in question are 
not used for human flight, the principal question, then, is whether a drone 
would constitute the “delivering . . . [of an] object by . . . airborne 
means.”113  
Based on the text of the NPS regulations alone, one could make credi-
ble arguments either way. On the one hand, the word “delivery” suggests 
transport of something other than the means of airborne propulsion itself. 
On the other hand, the person controlling the drone might be thought to be 
  
 106 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-11 
(1958); see also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 
1109-10 (2008) (discussing the debate surrounding this most famous hypothetical). 
 107 See Memorandum from Jonathan B. Jarvis, Dir., Nat’l Park Serv., to Reg’l Dirs. & Superinten-
dents, Policy Memorandum 14-05 (June 19, 2014) [hereinafter Jarvis Memorandum], available at 
www.nps.gov/policy/PolMemos/PM_14-05.htm.  
 108 36 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2013).  
 109 Id. 
 110 Jarvis Memorandum, supra note 107. 
 111 36 C.F.R. § 2.17. 
 112 36 C.F.R. § 1.4. 
 113 36 C.F.R. § 2.17. 
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“delivering” the drone itself, a position taken by at least one of the parks.114 
Perhaps textualist ingenuity might find one or the other of these readings 
more persuasive based on the text alone, or its surrounding semantic con-
text. But that is in part the point; with a constrained set of tools, the 
textualist is forced to a moment of creative ingenuity,115 which does not 
bode particularly well for the predictability of results. Now consider the 
preamble to the regulations. The preamble includes the following statement: 
“This regulation limits the operation and use of aircraft to designated areas 
and generally prohibits the air delivery of persons or property.”116 This 
statement provides solid support for the idea that the prohibition is on the 
depositing of something tangible, whether it is persons or property. Faced 
with a choice between making textual inferences alone or bringing in this 
part of the agency’s own articulated explanation of the scope of the regula-
tion, consulting the preamble gives the interpreter a more sure-footed basis 
for a conclusion. This is not to say that every preamble provides a helpful 
basis to ensure that the agency’s interpretation is consistent with the agen-
cy’s original understanding, but many do.117 
What this stylized example suggests is that insisting that an agency’s 
interpretation is consistent with the positions it took in the preamble reduc-
es the range of acceptable interpretations in a way accessible to the audi-
ence to whom the regulations apply. As opposed to inviting creative textual 
inferences, this approach offers something more quotidian, parsing the reg-
ulatory text in relation to the preamble. In that, it has a claim to offering 
more predictable interpretation.  
E. Systematic Effects and Objections 
A regulatory purposivism approach of this kind treats the agency’s jus-
tification for a regulation as something more than an elaborate nuisance 
necessary for the regulations to survive judicial challenge; it treats that rea-
son-giving exercise as creating commitments to the scope of application of 
the regulation. Treating preambles in this way augments the extent to which 
litigants and the public can use them as a source of guidance about the 
  
 114 See Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Drones) Prohibited in Yosemite National Park, NAT’L 
PARK SERV. (May 2, 2014), http://www.nps.gov/yose/parknews/use-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems-
drones-prohibited-in-yosemite-national-park.htm (invoking 36 C.F.R. § 2.17 to justify the prohibition).  
 115 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 373 (stating that with fewer interpretive tools the textualist “has to 
become more imaginative”). 
 116 48 Fed. Reg. 30,268 (June 30, 1983). 
 117 See KEVIN M. STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: EVALUATING PREAMBLES, 
REGULATORY TEXT, AND FREESTANDING DOCUMENTS AS VEHICLES FOR REGULATORY GUIDANCE 34 
(2014), available at http://www.acus.gov/report/final-guidance-rulemaking-process-evaluating-
preambles-regulatory-text-and-freestanding (report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the 
United States) (suggesting that agencies generally provided a detailed justifications for their rules).  
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proper construction of the regulation, and consistent with their guidance 
function.118 As a result, it would reduce agency flexibility to interpret their 
regulations in ways that may be plausible under the regulation’s text but 
inconsistent with the policies the agency posited as justifying the regula-
tions. That reduced flexibility, however, would directly serve the value of 
fair notice because it would allow the public to rely on the agency’s reasons 
for its regulations as a source of guidance.  
Some might object that this approach gives agencies divergent and un-
desirable incentives. On the one hand, it might be seen as giving agencies 
incentives to say as little as possible in their preambles to reduce the scope 
of interpretive constraint that their preambles create. The relatively de-
manding scope of hard look review, however, gives agencies strong coun-
tervailing incentives to carefully rationalize their regulations or face judicial 
reversal. Because those rationalizations are necessary for regulations to 
survive judicial review, those incentives to provide detailed explanations 
likely overwhelm the agency’s interest in preserving interpretive flexibility. 
Hard look review, in other words, provides a baseline requirement of rela-
tively elaborate reason-giving, reasons to which the agency can be held in 
future interpretation of its regulations.  
On the other hand, this approach might be viewed as giving agencies 
incentives to load their preambles with policy statements about their regula-
tions that they were not able—for political reasons, or otherwise—to in-
clude in the regulatory text. Here it is important to recall that statements in 
which the agency purports to bind must appear in the regulatory text;119 
preambles are not binding but merely guidance about the meaning of the 
text. As a result, a court will not treat the text of a preamble as creating 
binding obligation,120 and the agency will have to adopt regulatory text to 
  
 118 See Adoption of Recommendations, 79 Fed. Reg. 35,988, 35,992 (June 25, 2014) (noting the 
guidance function of preambles). 
 119 STACK, supra note 117, at 23 (“As a matter of blackletter law, under APA § 553, a ‘legislative’ 
rule must be subject to notice-and-comment whereas interpretative statements and general statements of 
policy are not. Thus, if a preamble or guidance document includes a statement that is a legislative rule, 
the rule is procedurally invalid under section 553.” (footnote omitted)).  
 120 While language in preambles is not occasionally challenged as improper legislative rules, courts 
have generally held that statements in preambles are interpretive rules or general statements of policy, 
and thus procedurally valid. See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(EPA’s premabular statement “merely informed the public that the agency would exercise its discretion 
by considering exposure only for low toxicity chemicals” and thus was a general policy statement); 
Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the EPA’s rule in its 
preamble was interpretive because it “represents the agency’s attempt to interpret the meaning of a 
statutory provision”); Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas v. Solis, No. 09-240, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 90155, at *47 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (holding that the preambular language was an 
interpretation because the language was “tied very closely” to the definition included in the regulation 
and “expressly purports to be an interpretation of that definition”); Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. 
Whitman, 260 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (“In this case, the interpretation [contained within the 
preamble] . . . is within the scope of the regulation . . . .”); Bd. of Trustees of Knox Cnty. Hosp. v. 
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bind the public. That reduces the utility of the preamble to provide an end-
run around having to include the statements in regulatory text. Moreover, it 
is not clear what harm there is in an agency providing a very elaborate pre-
amble. Indeed, the more detailed the preamble the greater interpretive con-
straint it imposes on the agency, at least under a regulatory purposivism 
approach.  
These arguments suggest that regulatory purposivism is less deferen-
tial than textualism when applied in reviewing the validity of agency’s post 
hoc interpretations of their regulations. Effectively the added constraint this 
approach provides derives from accepting (or deferring) to the agency’s 
original justifications for its regulations, but being less deferential to subse-
quent agency interpretations that are not consistent with those original justi-
fications. That provides grounds to suggest that, with regard to ambiguous 
texts, regulatory purposivism also provides greater notice to the regulated 
by identifying a narrower range of acceptable meanings and is arguably 
more predictable than a textualist approach.  
This is not a complete defense of regulatory purposivism as an ap-
proach to regulatory interpretation. One could still ask how this approach 
fares with regard to other values, such as the deference rationale of Chev-
ron,121 and background principles of political accountability. Nor does this 
interpretive approach directly address the incentives Seminole Rock may 
provide agencies to issue vague regulations. But hopefully it is suggestive 
of the fair notice and predictability gains of interpreting the text of regula-
tions in light of their preambles. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over the merits of Seminole Rock and Auer for review of 
agency interpretations of their own regulations has proceeded on familiar 
lines. Critics have challenged the doctrine’s consistency with rule-of-law 
  
Shalala, 959 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (“Rather than create or destroy substantive rights, the 
[preambular] policy simply clarifies what the Secretary believes the regulation means and explains how 
the Agency will apply it.”); OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 921 F. Supp. 812, 824 n.11 (D.D.C. 
1996) (explaining that an interpretation within the preamble does not transform the preamble into a legisla-
tive rule). See also STACK, supra note 117, at 24 n.133. 
 121 See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to 
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 132 (2000) (arguing that the entity that 
controls the meaning of the regulation has effective control over the meaning of the statute, and as a 
result, Seminole Rock deference is required to implement the delegation of interpretive authority over 
the statute to the agency recognized by Chevron); Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent 
and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (1999) (arguing 
that delegation of interpretive authority to an agency under Chevron also involves Seminole Rock-style 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations).  
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values and separation of powers; others have shown that the doctrine has 
expanded well beyond its origins. But this debate has not attended to the 
threshold issue implicated in Seminole Rock/Auer and under any standard 
addressing review of agency interpretation of their own regulations—the 
method of regulatory interpretation. Focusing on how the courts construe 
the regulation reveals that the method of interpretation may make as much 
difference to the outcome of review, and values underlying the debate over 
Seminole Rock/Auer, as whether the Court continues to apply the Seminole 
Rock/Auer doctrine or adopts a less deferential standard of review. In par-
ticular, an approach to interpreting regulations that insists on consistency 
with the regulation’s text and the commitments the agency made in its pre-
amble constrains the agency to a narrower set of possible meanings than 
looking to the text alone. That does not tell us whether the Court should 
retain or abandon the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine, but it does suggest that 
the interpretive approaches make a difference to when that standard results 
in deference to the agency.  
 
